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In the present paper we study the determinants of the margins paid by euro-area non-
financial corporations (NFCs) for their bank loans on top of the rates they earn for their 
deposits (bank lending margins). We use panel VAR techniques, in order to test for causality 
relationships and produce impulse response functions for eleven euro-area countries from 
2003:1 to 2014:12. The countries are separated into two groups (distressed and non-
distressed), in order to examine for heterogeneities in the relationships between lending 
margins; the period is also separated with reference to the peak of the global financial crisis 
(before and after the collapse of Lehman in September 2008). We find that significant 
heterogeneities existed even before the global financial crisis and remained in its aftermath, 
although the magnitude and the direction of the effects exercised by the explanatory variables 
have changed. Furthermore, apart from finding that market concentration and the prudence 
of banks’ management increase the lending margins NFCs pay for their loans, there is 
evidence of substitution effects between financing obtained from banks and corporate bond 
markets. The provision of ample liquidity from the ECB, in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis was found to be effective only for the core countries, suggesting that further 
policy actions are needed in order to reduce the fragmentation of bank lending and promote 
financial integration to the benefit of the euro-area real economy. 
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Bank Lending Margins in the Euro Area: The 






The difference between interest rates charged by banks on loans and those 
paid by banks on deposits, so called ‘bank lending margins’, is one of the 
main sources of the effects exercised by finance on economic activity. This 
topic is covered in the finance-growth nexus literature (see, for example, 
Claessens et al., 2012; Borio, 2012), while it is also related to the transmission 
of monetary policy (see, for example, Bernhofer and van Treeck, 2013; Aristei 
and Gallo, 2014; Hristov et al., 2014). In this regard, it should be noted that the 
global financial crisis (2007-2009) constitutes a point of reference in the finance 
literature due mainly to the changes incurred in the functioning of the 
financial system, stemming from the needs for deleveraging and prudence, 
and the numerous reforms it has brought in financial regulation.1 Thus, the 
volume of both these strands of literature has grown further since the global 
financial crisis (hereinafter, ‘the GFC’) erupted, as the need for highlighting 
the interconnectedness of financial and economic activity has increased in 
importance.                                                         1 As a result of the crisis, financial regulation has been strengthened globally with regulation covering various functions of the financial system: for example, we refer to (i) the Dodd-Frank Act, (ii) the ESRB Regulation, (iii) the ESMA Regulation, (iv) the Basel III Accord, (v) the SSM Regulation and (vi) the SRM Regulation. Butiglione, et al. (2014) describe debt-dynamics as a key contributor to the accumulation of imbalances that led, eventually, to the global financial crisis and argue for the crucial need for deleveraging in order to make the global financial system more 
resilient. Also, see the ‘Overview of Progress in Implementing the London Summit 
Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability’, Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Leaders, September 2009. 
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Financing economic activity is distinguished, according to the source to 
‘bank-based’ and ‘market-based’, while its composition has been found to 
play an important role (see Cambacorta et al., 2014). For example, in euro-area 
member-states financing comes mainly in the form of bank lending; so, the 
decline of bank credit in the aftermath of the GFC has had repercussions on 
economic activity2. Thus, the European Central Bank (ECB) has decided to 
ease liquidity provision rules, while the integrated and efficient financing of 
the real economy in the euro area is the main target of policy initiatives to 
increase financing from capital markets in the euro area economy.3 
 
In this respect, one factor leading to fragmentation within the euro area is the 
terms and conditions of the funding opportunities for non-financial 
corporations (NFCs) in different euro area countries. In particular, the cost 
they face when they increase bank loans may have multiple repercussions for 
the efficiency of their operations and the size of their profits; as a result, 
possible divergences in the cost of funding of euro area NFCs across different 
countries may lead to similar divergences in investment, growth and 
employment. This has been acknowledged by policy makers, thus specifying 
the differences in the financing conditions faced by euro-area NFCs as one of 
the reasons that motivate the European Commission’s initiative for 
establishing a Capital Markets Union (see European Commission, 2015).  
 
The banking sector is the main source of financing economic activity in the 
euro area, as the use of capital markets has lagged behind that, for example, of 
the United States. In this regard, an important development to take note of 
when addressing the issue of financing of the euro area NFCs is that the                                                         2 According to the International Capital Markets Association (2013), the decline in bank credit by US$1.5 trillion in 2012 as compared to 2007, was partially replaced by a US$1.2 trillion increase in corporate bond issuance during the same period.  3See, ‘Decisions of the ECB’s Governing Council’ on 18.7.2013 and 9.9.2013 and European Commission (2015), respectively. 
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banking sector in the euro area experienced important structural changes in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis. More specifically, at the end of 
2013 the total number of credit institutions and foreign branches in the euro 
area decreased to 5948 from 6690 in 2008, an 11% reduction (ECB, 2014). The 
reduction was not equally spread among member countries. For instance, in 
Greece the respective reduction was 38%, while in Austria it was 9% and in 
Belgium just 2%. According to the literature the increase in concentration may 
be good for the consumers of banking services if it leads to an increase in 
efficiency and technological innovation and a reduction in bank risk. On the 
other hand, it may be bad if it leads to higher prices and reduced services for 
consumers due to exploitation of increased market power.  
 
Lending rates have often been found to increase with concentration while 
upward deposit interest rate rigidity has been found to exist and be associated 
with market power. However, when assessing the cost of funding, the main 
focus should be on the net cost of financing; i.e. the rates the NFCs pay for 
their loans, on top of the rates they earn for their deposits. In this context, the 
aim of the present study is to examine whether bank lending margins for 
euro-area NFCs are formed heterogeneously and to provide findings of 
possible use for (pursued or proposed) policies that aim to cure the 
fragmentation of the bank credit supply in the euro area. For this reason, we 
(i) specify the effects on euro area bank lending margins of both country-
specific and euro-area wide determinants with relation to financial stability 
conditions; (ii) examine changes brought by the global financial crisis both 
across time and across countries; and, finally, (iii) investigate whether policy 
initiatives, related to ECB monetary policy and the initiative for an integrated 
corporate bond market, affect bank lending margins.  
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To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to report that, among other 
factors, banks determine their lending margins in close relationship to the 
ratio of loans to deposits, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. While 
standard factors, such as the market concentration ratio are also found to 
exert significant effects, the former finding highlights the effects of recent 
regulatory changes4 that link credit to the liquidity available to banks. 
 
Moreover, the results presented show that NFC bank lending margins in the 
euro area are determined heterogeneously between distressed and non-
distressed euro-area countries, both prior to and in the aftermath of the crisis, 
thus posing a challenge to policy makers for addressing the origins of the 
fragmented financing conditions. In particular, our results show that euro-
area NFCs face dissimilar costs when acquiring credit from banks, because of 
country-specific risk-aversion of banks in different euro-area member states. 
Also, we find that bank lending margins are significantly affected by the costs 
entailed by euro-area NFCs in tapping the bond market. As a result, 
broadening the potential sources of funding may prove to be a significant 
alternative that could, eventually lower the cost of bank lending to NFCs in 
distressed countries.     
 
Section 2 reviews the literature on the determinants of the bank lending 
margins. Section 3 describes the methodological framework and the data used 
for the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical 
results and section 5 controls the results for ECB’s non-standard liquidity 
provision and performs robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                         4 Namely the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014); also the loans-to-deposits ratio is directly related to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio foreseen by the Basel III. 
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2. Literature review   
2.1 Institutions and structure of the banking sector  
 
Banking markets in the euro area have undergone extensive changes in the 
last 30 years (Vives, 2001). After the 1940s-1970s period distinguished by 
strong banking regulation, intervention and stability, a period of liberalization 
and greater instability started in the 1980s. The pressure of globalisation, the 
establishment of EMU, the ensuing regulatory changes and technological 
developments affected competition and production efficiency (Berger et al, 
2004). European banking markets became increasingly integrated (Goddard et 
al., 2007). A wave of mergers followed in the 1990s raising concerns about 
increasing concentration (especially in local markets), sufficient 
competitiveness and financial stability as well as welfare loss (Bikker and 
Haaf, 2002; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos, 
2004).  
 
To counteract the side-effects and risks of further consolidation the Basel 
Accord framework advanced its three pillars of minimum risk adjusted 
capital requirements, tight supervision and market discipline (Cetorelli, 2004). 
Still, banking is a fragile industry subject to market failure characteristics such 
as asymmetric information and moral hazard. Even more so, as banking 
became more involved with the provision of services to investors and firms 
and proprietary trading and reduced its traditional retail part (taking deposits 
and granting loans) of its business. Hence, the desirability of competition is 
not as unambiguous as in other industries, since market power may reduce 
fragility, improve stability and moderate risk-taking incentives of this new 
banking product mix (Focarelli and Panetta, 2003; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2006).  
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Furthermore, Ratti, Lee and Seol (2008) find that firms in 14 European 
countries are less financially constrained when they operate in a highly 
concentrated banking sector. Market power seems to increase banks’ 
incentives to collect/produce information on potential borrowers and hence 
improves the financing process during the expansions and recessions of the 
1992-2005 period. Still, Boyd and de Nicolo (2005) find that risk-incentive 
mechanisms may operate in the direction of making banks riskier as their 
markets become more concentrated. This could be explained by the fact that 
as competition declines banks want to earn higher rents by charging higher 
loan rates and borrowers respond by adopting riskier projects.  Examining the 
relationship further Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos (2007) estimate an 
inverted U-effect of concentration on firms’ growth suggesting that market 
power has its highest positive effect at intermediate values of 
competition/concentration. On the contrary, Claessens and Laeven (2005) 
using a sample of 42 countries in the 1980s and 1990s, find that greater 
competition allows financially dependent industries to grow faster, 
supporting the view that more competition may reduce holdup problems and 
lower the cost of financial intermediation. In the same vein, van Leuvensteijn 
et al. (2013) find that competition in the European banking sector is likely to 
render the monetary policy transmission mechanism more effective, since 
stronger competition causes a more effective pass-through of policy rate 
changes into bank rates. 
 
The 2007-2009 crisis led to bank failures and further consolidation. As Vives 
(2010, p.3) underlines “the crisis marks a return to traditional banking and has 
tended to exacerbate the consolidation trend”. So bank profits have to focus 
again on traditional business and interest rate margins. Increased 
concentration leading to increased market power is helpful in this respect. 
Neven and Roller (1999) analysing competition in the European banking 
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industry develop and estimate an aggregate model which controls for 
asymmetries in market structure. Their findings include rejection of non-
cooperative Nash behaviour and favour cartel behaviour in both mortgage 
and corporate loan markets.  
 
2.2 Determinants of lending margins and spreads on bank rates   
The structure of the banking sector and in particular its monopolistic power is 
seen as a key factor for the determination of interest rates by banks for 
deposits, loans and the difference between the two. The central concept is 
that, assuming that banks are risk-averse agents intermediating between 
suppliers and demanders of funds that reach them in asymmetric times, they 
set their optimal rates so as to minimize (interest rate and credit) risks. Thus, 
the relationship between the lending margins charged by banks and the 
changing structural conditions in banking markets is at the epicentre of 
investigation of a large number of papers.  
 
The strand of the literature that associates market power with interest rate 
setting by banks mainly argues that increased competition in the banking 
sector contributes to lowering interest rates (see, for example Corvoisier and 
Gropp, 2002; Rughoo and Sarantis, 2014) or margins of interest rates (among 
others, Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 
2004; Demirguc-Kunt, leaven and Levine, 2004; van Leuvensteijn et al, 2013). 
Interestingly, in several cases heterogeneity is found to characterize these 
effects across countries, which in some cases is linked to the degree of 
financial integration (e.g. Rughoo and Sarantis, 2014) or to the method of 
measurement of market power (e.g. Carbo et al., 2009). Also, deviations from 
the standard case exist; Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005) argue that in case 
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other explanatory factors (e.g. bank size and efficiency, default risk and the 
economic cycle) are also accounted for, market power does not have 
significant effects on interest rate margins.  
 
As a result, bank lending margins are likely to be related to several 
determinants, including the market power of banks. Based on previous 
literature, the factors that may exert significant effects are: (i) the cost of 
funding; (ii) credit risk conditions; (iii) overall financial markets conditions; 
(iv) bank lending relative to economic activity; and (v) the adequacy of banks’ 
capital for their lending activities.  
 
2.3 Monetary policy transmission and ECB’s non-standard        
measures  
Furthermore, the monetary policy setting of interest rates has also been a 
central point of investigation in the literature on the specification of the bank 
lending margins. Particular attention has been given to the monetary policy of 
the ECB, even from the period when the euro area was launched (see, among 
others, Peersman and Smets, 2001; Angeloni et al., 2002). The theory 
underlying the monetary policy transmission mechanism is that monetary 
policy, channeled through interest rates or banks’ balance sheets, is 
transmitted to the rest of the economy and drives the cost of funding for 
NFCs and households. Moreover, the effects of a credible monetary authority 
arguably (see, for example, Kashyap et al., 1993) influence not only bank 
lending towards NFCs but the conditions the latter face in their access to 
financial market financing as well.   
 
The functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism is of 
particular interest to our paper, as it relates to the degree to which monetary 
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policy decisions (mainly the central bank’s benchmark rates), affect (or not) 
the interest rates set by commercial banks for their deposit and lending 
operations. The way the policy rates as set by the central bank pass through to 
the economy has been the focus of several research papers, resulting in the 
development of a strand of financial literature that emphasizes interest-rate 
pass through. One way of transmitting movements of the monetary policy 
rate to the economy is through the yield curve of sovereign bonds (see, among 
others, Cook and Hahn, 1989; Gurkaynak et al., 2005) and, as a consequence, 
to the rest of the financial markets’ instruments. De Bondt et al. (2005) show 
that the pass-through of short-term to long-term rates in the euro area plays a 
key role in the determination of bank lending rates and their sluggishness.  
 
Also, ever since the GFC erupted the attention on interest rate pass-through 
has increased and the literature, which is currently developing, highlights 
several interesting aspects of the way banks set their interest rates. Hristov et 
al., (2014) find that the interest rate pass-through to retail banks margins has 
been hampered after the GFC and attribute the widening of the spreads 
across euro area countries to the different structures of these economies. Also, 
Belke et al. (2013) highlight that heterogeneities in the interest rate pass-
through already existed both across different interest rates and across 
member-states in the period before the crisis. Aristei and Gallo (2014), also 
give support to the heterogeneity of monetary policy transmission, while 
rates on loans to NFCs are found to be more affected by changes in the short-
term rates. The question of the reaction by the ECB to the global financial 
crisis, is addressed in Reichlin (2014) who argues that, while the non-standard 
monetary policy measures succeeded in stabilizing the relationship between 
bank lending and economic activity in the period after the 2008 global 
recession and recovery, this has not been the case for the euro area recession 
of 2011.  
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The question of whether ECB’s non-standard measures have had an effect on 
the spreads of bank lending and deposit rates for NFCs remains unanswered, 




3. Framework for the empirical analysis  
3.1 Discussion of data and model specification  
In the present analysis we use a panel of country-specific data, that covers 
eleven member-states of the euro area (namely, Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), 
together with euro-area wide variables. The data set covers the period from 
2003:1 to 2014:12, in monthly frequency, while quarterly data series have been 
transformed to monthly by linear interpolation across the months of the 
quarter. Sources of the data are the Statistical Data Warehouse of the 
European Central Bank5 and Datastream6. 
 
Country-specific variables are: (i) the margin between lending and deposits 
rates to NFCs; (ii) sovereign bond spreads; (iii) the sector’s concentration ratio 
(i.e. the Herfindahl ratio); (iv) loans-to-deposits ratio; and (v) total loans-to-
gdp. We also incorporate euro area-wide variables, which enable us to reveal                                                         5  For ‘bank lending margins’ (SDW name: ‘lending margins of MFIs on loans in euro to non-
financial corporations’), ‘Total loans to non-financial corporations’, ‘Total Deposits from the 
private sector’, ‘GDP’, the ‘Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress’ and the ‘Herfindahl ratios’; loans-to-deposits and loans-to-gdp have been calculated by dividing ‘Total loans’ to ‘Deposits’ 
and ‘GDP’, respectively. 6 For Corporate bond spreads and sovereign bond spreads; both variables are constructed by taking the difference from the yield of the German ten-year Bund of (a) the yield of the ‘iBoxx EA non-fin. Corp’ index and (b) the ten-year bond yields of each EA country, respectively.   
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the similarities or the differences of the responses across countries. Such 
variables are: (vi) the spread of bond yields of euro-area NFCs against the 
German Bund; (vii) ECB’s base money (monetary base)7; and (viii) the ECB’s 
composite indicator of systemic stress (CISS).  
 
As we have already argued previous research provides support for the 
inclusion in the analysis of the bank lending margins of bank market power 
variables, such as the Herfindahl ratio. Also, while previous analyses have 
examined the effects of the provision of bank credit to bank lending margins, 
this paper is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to assess the effects of the 
provision of bank loans relative to the banks’ liquidity (i.e. the loan-to-deposit 
ratio), as foreseen in the newly established regulatory framework (i.e. BRRD 
and Basel III, see footnote 6), and relative to economic activity (i.e. the loan-to-
gdp ratio). 
 
On the other hand, (a) sovereign and (b) corporate bond spreads are 
examined here, again for the first time, to the best of our knowledge. In the 
case of sovereign spreads the aim is to reflect possible tensions on bank 
lending margins stemming from the sovereign debt crisis as mentioned in the 
literature on the feedback between bank and sovereign risks. Still, apart from 
the tensions in the aftermath of the GFC, sovereign bond spreads may have 
the opposite effects if banks substituted sovereign holdings for more loans, 
especially before the GFC. Similarly, the corporate bond spreads may have 
either substitution or spillover effects. This examination is of particular 
interest as it reflects the effects that may stem from alternative sources of                                                         7 Definition of base money: “Currency (banknotes and coins) in circulation plus the minimum reserves credit institutions are required to hold with the Eurosystem and any excess reserves they may voluntarily hold in the Eurosystem's deposit facility, all of which are liabilities on the 
Eurosystem's balance sheet. Base money is sometimes also referred to as the "monetary base".”  
(source: ECB’s monetary policy glossary,  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/act4b.en.html) 
Bank Lending Margins in the Euro Area 
    12 
financing for euro-area corporates and, as a result, provide input to recent 
policy initiatives.  
 
Finally, we also examine the effects of the liquidity and stress conditions on 
the determination of bank lending margins. In the first case, the liquidity 
conditions are captured by ECB’s monetary base, which in the aftermath of 
the GFC reflects the provision of ample liquidity through the ECB’s non-
standard monetary policy operations; as a result including this measure may 
shed light on the significance of the non-standard monetary policies for one of 
their main targets, i.e. the decrease in the fragmentation of lending conditions 
in the euro-area economy. In the second case, the inclusion of the composite 
indicator for systemic stress (CISS) reflects the changes in the systemic risk 
conditions that occurred in the euro area before and after the eruption of the 
GFC. Also the inclusion of the CISS variable serves the purpose of accounting 
for exogenous factors that may have affected systemic risk conditions in the 
euro area as a whole; for this purpose, while all the former variables 
(numbered (i) to (vii)) are considered as endogenous to the VAR setup, the 
CISS enters in the system’s equations as an exogenous variable. 
  
3.2 The panel VAR setup 
 
The present empirical analysis is set up so as to address challenges stemming 
from both the time and the cross-section dimensions of the sample. Since 
possible heterogeneities have been reported elsewhere in relation to euro-area 
banking markets (see, for example, Mayordomo et al., 2015), we form two 
different (distressed and non-distressed) panels of countries: Austria (AT), 
Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE) and the Netherlands 
(NL) form the latter and Spain (ES), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT) and 
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Portugal (PT) the former. The criterion for this classification is the dispersion 
of the spreads of (loan and deposit) interest rates paid by NFCs (see Chart 1, 
in the Appendix).8  
 
Note that the perspective we adopt allows us to draw conclusions related to 
economic policy and the finance-growth nexus. Consequently, the country-
wide data suffice to capture developments affecting the entire banking system 
of each country and the euro area as a whole, while we do not aim to reflect 
on bank-specific developments. Thus, we focus on country-specific instead of 
bank-specific data and relate the results of our analysis to macro-economic 
and financial conditions.  
 
Also, we analyse the rate setting by euro-area banks separately for the periods 
before and after the GFC, with reference to its peak, i.e. the collapse of 
Lehman in September 2008. Also, the GFC is seen as a potential source of non-
linear features in the underlying relationships, as (a) it produced a shock in 
the financial system that led to significant changes in the regulatory 
framework ever since and (b) it has been a significant source of fragmentation 
in the financing conditions of euro-area banking sectors. In this way, we 
combine the examination of asymmetries of the responses of different euro-
area countries’ bank lending margins to the same determinants with possible 
regime shifts. As a result, another contribution of the present analysis is that, 
in this way, we address simultaneously possible non-linear patterns that 
would otherwise drive our results in a panel setup for the entire data sample. 
Our aim is to find causal relationships that explain bank lending margins, 
taking into account possible changes during the sub-periods, as well as 
differences in these effects across the countries of our sample. For this reason 
we employ panel vector auto-regression (panel VAR) techniques, enriched                                                         8 Source of the data is ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse. 
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with country-specific dummies, in order to estimate fixed effects for our panel 
of countries.  
 
One important advantage of the panel VAR methodology, compared to 
single-equation methods, is that it enables the researcher to isolate co-
variations of the data, by estimating the variance-covariance relationship of 
all equations simultaneously. Thus, the econometric specification we employ 
is suitable to overcome the problem of endogeneity between the bank lending 
margins and their determinants, by treating all the variables of the system as 
endogenous.  
 
On the other hand, it is for the researcher to follow theoretical considerations 
when setting up a VAR. As a result, we form a panel vector autoregressive 










     (1)
  
Yj (Yji= yj1, yj2, …, yjk) stands for the vector of the endogenous variables with 
the subscript j={1, 2, …, 6} denoting each of the dependent variables (i.e. bank 
lending margins, NFC bond spreads, sovereign bond spreads, the Herfindahl 
ratio, loans-to-deposits and loans-to-gdp) and Σi is the variance-covariance 
matrix. The subscript i={1, 2, 3, …, k}  stands for the countries in each group, 
t={1, 2, 3, …, n} denotes time and A(L) are the vectors of the coefficients of the 
autoregressive and explanatory variables. Also, as noted above, based on 
previous findings, we introduce country-specific dummies, that take the value 
of 1 for every point in time for the entire period, in order to bring the panel 
VAR setup closer to that of panel regressions with fixed effects (A0=aij={aj1, aj2, 
…, ajk}). Finally, lagged positive (negative) differences of the CISS from its 
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mean, are introduced as an exogenous explanatory variable, in order to 
capture rises (falls) of systemic stress in the euro-area’s financial system. Note, 
that the latter variable is thus set to reflect euro-area wide systemic risk 
conditions and we may compare for its effects across the different equations 
(i.e. B= bj ={bi, b2,…, b6}). 
 
As already discussed, we estimate separately the coefficients of the equations 
for the two panels of euro area countries (p=1, for the first panel, p=2, for the 
second) and for the periods prior to and after the collapse of Lehman, which 
took place in September 2008. On the choice of this event as the turning point 
in our examination, we note that there are two main reasons: (a) the fact that 
the collapse of Lehman is widely considered the peak of the global financial 
crisis and (b) that the regime switching methodologies have not yet evolved 
for panel VAR.  
 
As a result of (b), above, the task of specifying the exact time of a regime shift 
in panel VAR setups is not as straightforward as in time series models; thus, 
instead of estimating the turning point of different regimes, e.g. as in Markov 
switching VAR models, in the panel VAR this has to be based on the 
researcher’s choice. So, we choose to separate the period of the sample into 
two parts, i.e. before and after the collapse of Lehman and the subsequent 
market turbulence. The first sub-period extends from 2003:1 to 2008:8, i.e. 
before the Lehman collapse, and the second sub-period begins from 2009:1 to 
2014:12. The reasons for excluding observations around the events 
immediately after the collapse of Lehman is that: (a) we intend to capture 
deterministic relationships before and after this event and (b) we do not want 
the inference of our estimators to be affected by event-specific increased 
volatility, such as that which occurred immediately after the collapse of 
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Lehman; for these two reasons we exclude the period of 2008:9-2008:12 from 
our sample. 
 
From the setup described above we examine the causal relationships between 
the bank lending margins along with the explanatory variables classified as 
country-specific or euro area-wide. Specifically, if we expand equation (1) to 









































              (2)
   
So, for any given yj, we can examine whether it is caused, in the sense of 
Granger (1969), by other variables participating in the VAR, by employing a 













Finally, based on the panel VAR models we generate the responses of the 
bank lending margins to NFCs to shocks occurring in the rest of the system 
variables. So, we may simulate the behaviour of the series for a given 
development in the explanatory variables. Trying to focus on our paper’s 
main target, i.e. the determinants of bank lending margins, we minimize the 
discussion of the results related to the rest of the explanatory variables. Apart 
from falling outside the scope of the present paper, specific investigation of 
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each of these variables is either done elsewhere (e.g. the sovereign spreads) or 
is left for future research.  
 
Several alternative setups have been estimated to check for robustness.9 So, 
while initially we do not account for the liquidity provision by the ECB, as 
this is reflected by base money, we include it as a form of robustness check. In 
particular, we incorporate in the panel VAR a variable that captures the 
changes in the base money of the ECB and estimate the relationship for the 
post-crisis period, in order to answer the question of the significance of ECB’s 
non-standard monetary policy on lending margins. Finally, we examine 
whether the results are driven by specific countries included in our sample. 
 
 
4. The empirical analysis  
4.1 The first sub-period 
  
Our empirical investigation begins by, first, specifying the number of lags that 
must be included in the VAR, for the first sub-period (2003:1-2008:8) in order 
to fully capture the dynamics of the system of autoregressive equations. For 
this reason, we use the standard likelihood-based information criteria; the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian, or Schwartz, information 
criterion (SIC) and the Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ). Table 1 presents the 
results of the information criteria for the lag structure.  
 
 
                                                        9 For example, we examined inclusion of more variables, such as credit, deposits, the indices for credit standards by ECB’s Bank Lending Survey and others. Results are available upon request. 
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Table 1: Lag selection (2003:1-2008:8) Lags AIC SIC HQ 
First panel of countries (AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, NL) 1 -11.159 -10.271 -10.804 2 -11.149 -9.815 -10.615 3 -11.193 -9.415 -10.481 4 -11.999 -9.776 -11.109** 5 -12.045 -9.378 -10.978 6 -12.111 -8.999 -10.865 7 -12.108 -8.553 -10.685 8 -12.101 -8.101 -10.500 
Second panel of countries (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT) 1 -10.721 -9.833 -10.366 2 -10.783 -9.444 -10.244 3 -10.742 -8.966 -10.032 4 -11.393 -9.169 -10.502** 5 -11.433 -8.765 -10.364 6 -11.394 -8.285 -10.151 7 -11.421 -7.869 -10.002 8 -11.362 -7.358 -9.757 
 
Lags are specified separately for each group of countries examined; we find 
that in both panels of countries, for the period before the GFC, the inclusion of 
four lags in the system is indicated. So, we next estimate the 
interdependencies of the variables of the system, in the form of a system of 
autoregressive equations. Tables 2 and 3 present the full VAR results, together 
with the diagnostic tests and statistics. 
 
First, the diagnostics indicate the good performance of the system; the 
adjusted R-squareds indicate that the deterministic part of each of the 
variables is significantly captured by the present setup. The estimated 
coefficients of the VAR, indicate that the bank lending margins are found to 
have significant autoregressive effects, both in the first and in the second 
panel of countries. Accordingly, the constant term is also found to be 
significant and positive while the inclusion of country-specific dummies 
enables the revelation of significant fixed effects in several countries; for the 
first panel the significance of the positive fixed coefficients for Belgium and 
Finland is confirmed and in the second panel the fixed coefficient for Portugal 
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is found to be positive and significant, whereas the fixed coefficient for Spain 
is found to be negative and significant.  
 
Table 2: VAR – first panel (AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, NL), pre-Lehman collapse (2003:1 to 
2008:8)  Bank lending margins NFC bond spreads Sovereign bond spreads Herfindahl ratio Loans to Deposits ratio Loans to GDP ratio Lend. margins t-1 0.457 (0.059) - - - -2.599 (0.881) - Lend. margins t-2 - - - -0.169 (0.090) 2.255 (0.957) - Lend. margins t-3 0.163 (0.062) -0.114 (0.058) 0.029 (0.017) - - - Lend. margins t-4 - - - - - - NFC spreads t-1 - 0.742 (0.059) -0.031 (0.018) - - - NFC spreads t-2 - 0.148 (0.076) - - - 0.020 (0.009) NFC spreads t-3 - - - - 2.136 (1.759) -0.025 (0.009) NFC spreads t-4 - - - - - - Sov. spreads t-1 0.327 (0.208) - - - - 0.053 (0.026) Sov. spreads t-2 - - - - - -0.065 (0.033) Sov. spreads t-3 - -0.425 (0.251) - - - - Sov. spreads t-4  0.638 (0.195) - - - - Herfindahl t-1 - - - 0.974 (0.038) - - Herfindahl t-2 -0.084 (0.036) - - - - - Herfindahl t-3 0.074 (0.036) - - 0.766 (0.052) - - Herfindahl t-4 - - - -0.798 (0.040) - - Loans/Deposits t-1 - - - - 0.949 (0.058) - Loans/Deposits t-2 - - - - - 0.001 (0.6*10-4) Loans/Deposits t-3 - - - - - - Loans/Deposits t-4 - - - 0.011 (0.005) 0.116 (0.058) -0.001 (0.4*10-4) Loans/GDP t-1 - - - - - 0.812 (0.059) Loans/GDP t-2 - - - - - - Loans/GDP t-3 - - -0.343 - - - 
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(0.182) Loans/GDP t-4 - - - - - - Dummy AT - -0.331 (0.082) - 0.324 (0.123) -2.714 (1.309) - Dummy BE 0.212 (0.167) - - 0.617 (0.176) - - Dummy DE - 0.316 (0.078) - -0.318 (0.123) 2.703 (1.311) - Dummy FI 0.413 0.167) - - 0.958 (0.236) - - Dummy FR - - - - - - Constant 0.682 (0.142) - - 0.515 (0.201) - - 
Δ(CISS) t-1 - 0.783 (0.119) 0.095 (0.036) - - - 
Diagnostics-equation specific Adj. R-squared 0.847 0.957 0.865 0.999 0.978 0.999 Log Likelihood 313.805 332.968 719.29 202.875 553.585 995.521 Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test -7.719 [0.000] -8.056 [0.000] -7.393 [0.000] -7.296 [0.000] -7.747 [0.000] -8.315 [0.000] 
Diagnostics-system Log likelihood AIC SIC Cov(ri , rj) LM (1) LM (3) LM (5) 2045.464 -11.659 -9.539 2.04*10-13 33.795 [0.574] 79.791 [0.241] 41.931 [0.229] 
Correlation of the residuals   NFC margins NFC spreads Sov. spreads Herfindahl Loans/Deposits Loans/GDP Lend. margins 1      NFC spreads 0.190 1     Sov. spreads 0.103 0.312 1    Herfindahl -0.021 -0.164 -0.075 1   Loans/Deposits -0.037 0.134 -0.051 0.036 1  Loans/GDP -0.068 0.038 0.012 -0.011 -0.075 1 Note: Only significant estimators are reported; figures in parenthesis are standard errors, while figures in brackets report p-values AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion, SIC is the Schwartz IC, Cov(ri , rj) represents the cross-section covariance of the residuals and LM stands for the maximum likelihood test for serial correlation.               
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Table 3: VAR – second panel (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT pre-Lehman collapse (2003:1 to 2008:8)  Bank lending margins NFC bond spreads Sovereign bond spreads Herfindahl ratio Loans to Deposits ratio Loans to GDP ratio Lend. margins t-1 0.394 (0.059) - - -0.027 (0.018) -2.268 (1.202) - Lend. margins t-2 0.223 (0.064) - -0.029 (0.018) - -  Lend. margins t-3 0.134 (0.064) - - - - - Lend. margins t-4 - - - - - - NFC spreads t-1 - 0.687 (0.061) - 0.055 (0.029) - - NFC spreads t-2 - 0.122 (0.076) - - - - NFC spreads t-3 - - - - - - NFC spreads t-4 - 0.105 (0.060) - - - - Sov. spreads t-1 - - 0.678 (0.066) - -  Sov. spreads t-2 - - - - - - Sov. spreads t-3 - - - - 12.504 (2.138) - Sov. spreads t-4 - - - - - - Herfindahl t-1 - - - 0.929 (0.040) -0.136 (0.085) - Herfindahl t-2 -0.337 (0.180) - - - - - Herfindahl t-3 - - - 0.692 (0.055) - -0.033 (0.019) Herfindahl t-4 - - - -0.697 (0.039) - - Loans/Deposits t-1 - - - - 0.928 (0.063) - Loans/Deposits t-2 - - - - - 0.001 (0.4*10-4) Loans/Deposits t-3 - - - - - - Loans/Deposits t-4 - - - - - -0.001 (0.3*10-4) Loans/GDP t-1 - - - - - 0.874 (0.063) Loans/GDP t-2 - - - - - - Loans/GDP t-3 - - - - - - Loans/GDP t-4 - - - - - - Dummy ES -0.442 (0.249) - -0.168 (0.070) -0.363 (0.076) - - Dummy GR - - 0.166 (0.061) 0.332 (0.068) - - Dummy IE - - -0.163 (0.062) -0.332 (0.068) - - Dummy IT - - -0.156 (0.093) -0.542 (0.101) - - Dummy PT 0.119 0.159 - - - -0.008 
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(0.048) (0.032) (0.004) Constant 0.895 (0.426) - 0.241 (0.119) 0.599 (0.129) - - 
Δ(CISS) t-1 - 0.687 (0.117) 0.167 (0.051) - - - 
Diagnostics-equation specific Adj. R-squared 0.933 0.957 0.929 0.999 0.975 0.999 Log Likelihood 206.117 346.656 612.834 586.564 759.124 932.424 Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test  -8.098 [0.000] -7.628 [0.000] -7.872 [0.000] -8.097 [0.000] -7.899 [0.000] -7.709 [0.000] 
Diagnostics-system Log likelihood AIC SIC Cov(ri , rj) LM (1) LM (3) LM (5) 1992.111 -11.326 -9.206 1.58*10-13 68.552 [0.000] 60.013 [0.007] 40.398 [0.282] 
Correlation of the residuals   NFC margins NFC spreads Sov. spreads Herfindahl Loans/Deposits Loans/GDP Lend. margins 1      NFC spreads 0.055 1     Sov. spreads 0.011 0.428 1    Herfindahl -0.007 -0.037 0.023 1   Loans/Deposits 0.061 0.054 -0.044 -0.098 1  Loans/GDP -0.083 -0.111 -0.080 0.003 0.391 1 Note: Only significant estimators are reported; figures in parenthesis are standard errors, while figures in brackets report p-values AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion, SIC is the Schwartz IC, Cov(ri , rj) represents the cross-section covariance of the residuals and LM stands for the maximum likelihood test for serial correlation. 
 
Also, we find that for both panels of countries the Herfindahl ratio has a 
significant effect on bank lending margins, although for the second panel the 
significance is marginal; the relationship between bank lending margins and 
the banking market concentration has been well documented in previous 
literature and could reflect either a risk-incentive mechanism, such as the one 
described in Boyd and Nicolo (2008) or an even more complicated form of 
effects, such as the one found in de Guevara et al. (2007). It seems, though, 
that the two panels of countries differ in the form of the effects exercised by 
banking concentration; in particular, for the first panel a possible U-shape, 
such as the one of de Guevara et al. (2007), which indicates possible existence 
of synergies in the medium term exists, while a change in sign, that would 
justify such a shape, does not exist in the second panel of countries. Also, in 
both cases the negative sign may reflect the fact that, during this period, 
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banks expanded their balance sheets (see, Buttiglione et al., 2014)  and, thus 
they may have been providing easier terms for credit to NFCs, the more 
concentrated the bank sector became, i.e. in line with strengthening their 
position.  
 
Although the results of the relationship of the banking market concentration 
ratios to the bank lending margins are found to be similar across distressed 
and non-distressed countries, this is not the case for other explanatory 
variables. Specifically, in the first panel of countries the bank lending margin 
is found to be affected, positively, by the sovereign bond spreads against the 
German ten-year bond, while this is not the case for the second panel of 
countries.  
 
Table 4: Granger causality tests: Lending rates margins (2003:1-2008:8) 
Explanatory variable X2 stat. p-value First panel of countries (AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, NL) NFC bond spreads 5.118 0.275 Sovereign bond spreads 8.145 0.086 Herfindahl 18.836 0.001 Loans-to-deposits 2.376 0.667 Loans-to-gdp 5.911 0.206 Second panel of countries (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT) NFC bond spreads 4.443 0.349 Sovereign bond spreads 1.464 0.833 Herfindahl 5.821 0.212 Loans-to-deposits 3.326 0.505 Loans-to-gdp 1.712 0.789 Note: The table reports the results of Chi-square (X2) tests of the null of exclusion of the explanatory variable from the equation of the bank lending margins dependent variable. Figures in bold letters denote rejection of the null. 
 
From the Granger causality tests (see Table 4) it is shown that heterogeneity is 
present even in the case of the Herfindahl ratio; in particular, this variable is 
not found to exercise significant causal effects on the bank lending margins of 
the distressed countries. Similarly the causal effects of the sovereign bond 
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spreads are found to be only marginally significant, for non-distressed 
countries.   
 
Table 5: Impulse responses of bank lending margins, pre-Lehman collapse 
(2003:1 – 2008:8) First panel (AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, NL) Months NFC bond spreads Sovereign spreads Herfindahl Loans/Deposits Loans/GDP 1 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 2 2.9*10-4 (0.005) 0.008 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005) -0.001 (0.006) 3 0.002 (0.009) 0.011 (0.009) -0.007 (0.006) 0.010 (0.009) -0.005 (0.009) 4 0.001 (0.012) 0.022 (0.013) -0.011 (0.009) 0.009 (0.013) -0.005 (0.013) 5 -0.001 (0.014) 0.036 (0.016) -0.014 (0.013) 0.011 (0.016) -0.008 (0.016) 10 -0.004 (0.029) 0.099 (0.040) -0.078 (0.035) 0.038 (0.030) -0.024 (0.028) 12 -0.001 (0.037) 0.123 (0.053) -0.113 (0.044) 0.049 (0.038) -0.031 (0.033) 18 0.019 (0.066) 0.189 (0.092) -0.234 (0.076) 0.075 (0.064) -0.045 (0.049) 24 0.001 (0.003) 0.079 (0.073) -0.192 (0.095) 0.007 (0.054) -0.011 (0.041) Second panel (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT) Months NFC bond spreads Sovereign spreads Herfindahl  Loans/Deposits  Loans/GDP  1 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 2 0.008 (0.007) -0.003 (0.008) 0.007 (0.005) -0.004 (0.008) -0.007 (0.008) 3 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.014) 0.001 (0.009) 0.001 (0.013) -0.011 (0.013) 4 0.003 (0.017) -0.003 (0.019) -0.004 (0.013) -0.008 (0.019) -0.006 (0.019) 5 -0.002 (0.020) -0.009 (0.025) -0.002 (0.019) -0.012 (0.025) -0.007 (0.022) 10 -0.023 (0.041) -0.041 (0.059) -0.039 (0.053) -0.037 (0.052) -0.007 (0.041) 12 -0.037 (0.050) -0.056 (0.070) -0.053 (0.066) -0.048 (0.062) -0.008 (0.048) 18 -0.091 (0.082) -0.100 (0.103) -0.091 (0.103) -0.078 (0.091) -0.21 (0.067) 24 -0.149 (0.119) -0.139 (0.129) -0.107 (0.129) -0.107 (0.122) -0.045 (0.087) 
Note: The table reports the bank lending margins’ accumulated impulse responses to a shock equal to one standard deviation of the explanatory variables, in the next months. Figures in bold letters denote significant responses in a 5% confidence interval, while parentheses are standard errors. 
 
The results of simulated effects on bank lending margins, based on the 
estimated impulse response functions (IRFs), are reported in Table 6 above. 
The IRFs illustrate the effects that a shock equal to one standard deviation of 
the explanatory variables has on the dependent variable, i.e. on the bank 
lending margins. As expected the sovereign bond spreads and the Herfindahl 
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ratio are the only sources of significant responses of the bank lending margin 
for non-distressed countries, whereas distressed countries do not significantly 
respond to shocks by any other variable of the system. Also, we find that an 
increase in the sovereign cost of funding, for these countries relative to 
Germany, increased the bank lending margin, in the period before the 
collapse of Lehman, while synergies from higher bank market concentration 
exercised negative effects.  
 
Finally, the bottom lines of Tables 3 and 4, report diagnostics for the system 
and for each equation separately. First, the coefficients of determination for 
the bank lending margins are high enough (adj. R-squared is 0.85 for the first 
panel of countries and 0.93 for the second) to indicate that the deterministic 
components of these variables are efficiently captured by the econometric 
setup we have used. Moreover, the reported values of the Im et al. (2003) tests, 
indicate that in both panels of countries and for all the dependent variables of 
the system, the residuals are stationary, which indicates that their variances 
are bounded and the system’s estimators are unbiased. Naturally, next comes 
the issue of independence of the results; for this reason, we estimated the 
cross sectional covariance of the residuals of the system and the resulting 
figure is very small, while the autocorrelation decays in a fairly fast pace, i.e. 
at a maximum of five lags. Also, cross-correlations of the residuals indicate 
that the residuals of the bank lending margins are not highly correlated with 
any other residuals of the deterministic variables in their equation, indicating 
independence of the estimators from any non-included deterministic terms of 
the rest of the system. As a result, in both distressed and non-distressed 
country panels, the in-sample performance of the system provides a 
satisfactory degree of confidence to the estimations.    
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4.2 The second sub-period  
 
Next, we turn to the results of the panel VAR estimation for the same two 
country panels for the second period, i.e. the period following the peak of the 
GFC in the last quarter of 2008. Again, we first specify the number of lags that 
must be included in the panel VAR; Table 6 presents the respective 
information criteria statistics. 
 
Τable 6: Lag selection (2009:1-2014:12) Lags AIC SIC HQ First panel of countries (AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, NL) 1  8.970  9.358  9.124 2 -3.146  -2.368 -2.837 3 -3.143 -1.977 -2.680 4 -3.124 -1.570  -3.229** 5 -4.001 -2.058 -2.506 6 -3.904 -1.573 -2.977 7 -3.886 -1.166 -2.804 8  -4.103 -0.994 -2.867 Second panel of countries (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT) 1  19.892  20.281  20.047 2  3.326  4.104  3.635 3  3.254  4.419  3.718 4  3.184  4.739  3.802 5   2.023   3.966   2.796** 6  2.121  4.452  3.048 7  2.134  4.854  3.215 8  2.148  5.257  3.384 
 
So, based on these results, we formulate a panel VAR, for each of the two 
groups of countries for the period 2009:1 to 2014:12, with four lags. The 
inspection of the results, contained in Tables 7 and 8, indicates that the 
autoregressive effects of the bank lending margins are not found to have 
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Table 7: VAR – first panel (AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, NL), post-Lehman collapse (2009:1 to 2014:12)  Bank lending margins NFC bond spreads Sovereign bond spreads Herfindahl ratio Loans to Deposits ratio Loans to GDP ratio Lend. margins t-1 0.439 (0.053) - - - 2.071 (1.268) - Lend. margins t-2 - -0.155 (0.059) -0.105 (0.051) -0.169 (0.090) 2.255 (0.957) - Lend. margins t-3 0.236 (0.056) - 0.089 (0.051) - - - Lend. margins t-4 -0.108 (0.053) - - - - - NFC spreads t-1 - 0.927 (0.051) 0.096 (0.043) - - - NFC spreads t-2 - - -0.129 (0.058) - - 0.018 (0.009) NFC spreads t-3 - 0.139 (0.063) 0.167 (0.054) 0.132 (0.071) - -0.022 (0.009) NFC spreads t-4 - -0.136 (0.037) -0.122 (0.031) - - - Sov. spreads t-1 - 0.236 (0.065) 0.791 (0.056) - - -0.019 (0.009) Sov. spreads t-2 - - 0.137 (0.071) - - 0.019 (0.012) Sov. spreads t-3 - -0.268 (0.082) - - - - Sov. spreads t-4 - 0.142 (0.065) -0.090 (0.056) -0.116 (0.073) - - Herfindahl t-1 - - - 0.950 (0.036) - - Herfindahl t-2 - -0.102 (0.043) - - - - Herfindahl t-3 - - - 0.753 (0.048) - - Herfindahl t-4 - 0.107 (0.031) - -0.741 (0.035) 1.287 (0.702) - Loans/Deposits t-1 - - - - 0.918 (0.055) - Loans/Deposits t-2 -0.007 (0.003) - - - - - Loans/Deposits t-3 - - - - - - Loans/Deposits t-4 0.006 (0.003) - - 0.005 (0.003) - - Loans/GDP t-1 - - - - - 0.896 (0.055) Loans/GDP t-2 - - - - - - Loans/GDP t-3 - - - - - - Loans/GDP t-4 - -0.644 (0.375) - - -13.886 (8.372) -0.089 (0.055) Dummy AT -0.336 (0.182) - - - 18.125 (4.300) 0.045 (0.028) Dummy BE - -0.165 (0.079) - 0.216 (0.088) - - Dummy DE 0.322 - - - -18.533 (4.384) - 
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(0.180) Dummy FI - - - 0.848 (0.199) - - Dummy FR -0.254 (0.063) -0.135 (0.067) - - 4.644 (1.492) - Constant 0.675 (0.168) - - 0.324 (0.198) 8.959 (3.961) 0.057 (0.026) 
Δ(CISS) t-1 - 1.175 (0.158) 0.233 (0.135) - - - 
Diagnostics-equation specific Adj. R-squared 0.833 0.946 0.921 0.999 0.903 0.999 Log Likelihood 232.709 212.183 268.554 171.065 905.885 906.446 Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test -8.731 [0.000] -10.473 [0.000] -8.788 [0.000] -7.562 [0.000] -7.898 [0.000] -8.315 [0.000] 
Diagnostics-system Log likelihood AIC SIC Cov(ri , rj) LM (1) LM (3) LM (5) 900.216 -4.001 -2.058 2.71*10-10 138.032 [0.000] 73.058 [0.001] 38.643 [0.351] 
Correlation of the residuals   NFC margins NFC spreads Sov. spreads Herfindahl Loans/Deposits Loans/GDP Lend. margins 1      NFC spreads 0.050 1     Sov. spreads 0.042 0.205 1    Herfindahl 0.023 -0.038 0.012 1   Loans/Deposits 0.038 -0.055 0.026 -0.002 1  Loans/GDP 0.060 0.138 0.050 -0.075 -0.008 1 Note: Only significant estimators are reported; figures in parenthesis are standard errors, while figures in brackets report p-values AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion, SIC is the Schwartz IC, Cov(ri , rj) represents the cross-section covariance of the residuals and LM stands for the maximum likelihood test for serial correlation.   
Table 8: VAR – second panel (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT), post-Lehman collapse (2009:1 to 2014:12)  Bank lending  margins NFC bond spreads Sovereign bond spreads Herfindahl ratio Loans to Deposits ratio Loans to GDP ratio Lend. margins t-1 0.584 (0.056) 0.069 (0.030) - -0.027 (0.018) -2.268 (1.202) - Lend. margins t-2 0.130 (0.063) - -0.029 (0.018) - -  Lend. margins t-3 0.123 (0.063) -0.059 (0.034) - - - - Lend. margins t-4 - - -0.510 (0.296) - - - NFC spreads t-1 -0.227 (0.091) 0.978 (0.049) 0.984 (0.498) 0.055 (0.029) - 0.013 (0.008) NFC spreads t-2 0.320 (0.127) -0.119 (0.069) - - - - NFC spreads t-3 - 0.135 (0.066) - - - -0.016 (0.009) NFC spreads t-4 - -0.151 - - - - 
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(0.039) Sov. spreads t-1 -0.018 (0.010) -0.009 (0.006) 0.886 (0.056) 0.015 (0.006) -  Sov. spreads t-2 - - - -0.015 (0.008) - - Sov. spreads t-3 - - 0.155 (0.078) - 12.504 (2.138) - Sov. spreads t-4 - - -0.114 (0.057) - -0.180 (0.101) - Herfindahl t-1 -0.106 (0.055) - - 0.985 (0.033) -0.136 (0.085) - Herfindahl t-2 - - - - - - Herfindahl t-3 0.119 (0.075) - -1.111 (0.411) 0.952 (0.044) -1.393 (0.735)  Herfindahl t-4 - - - -0.913 (0.037) 1.673 (0.610) - Loans/Deposits t-1 -0.014 (0.005) 0.005 (0.002) - - 0.914 (0.054) - Loans/Deposits t-2 0.015 (0.007) - - - - 0.001 (0.6*10-4) Loans/Deposits t-3 - - - - 0.245 (0.072) -0.002 (0.6*10-4) Loans/Deposits t-4 - - - - - 0.001 (0.5*10-4) Loans/GDP t-1 - -0.602 (0.361) - - - 0.949 (0.055) Loans/GDP t-2 -1.469 (0.903) 0.886 (0.491) - - - - Loans/GDP t-3 - 0.787 (0.446) - - - - Loans/GDP t-4 - -1.117 (0.332) - - - - Dummy ES -0.442 (0.249) - -0.168 (0.070) -0.363 (0.076) - - Dummy GR   1.472 (0.607) - 1.718 (1.098) 0.024 (0.009) Dummy IE - - -0.163 (0.062) -0.332 (0.068) - - Dummy IT - - -0.156 (0.093) -0.542 (0.101) - - Dummy PT 0.119 (0.048) 0.159 (0.032) - - - -0.008 (0.004) Constant 0.895 (0.426) - 0.241 (0.119) 0.599 (0.129) - - 
Δ(CISS) t-1 - 0.687 (0.117) 0.167 (0.051) - - - 
Diagnostics-equation specific Adj. R-squared 0.918 0.944 0.925 0.999 0.979 0.999 Log Likelihood 13.348 205.305 626.462 176.165 835.685 884.549 Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test -8.205 [0.000] -10.289 [0.000] -7.908 [0.000] -8.399 [0.000] -8.056 [0.000] -8.425 [0.000] 
Diagnostics-system 
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Log likelihood AIC SIC Cov(ri , rj) LM (1) LM (3) LM (5) 184.211 2.023 3.966 1.12*10-7 142.282 [0.000] 101.067 [0.007] 46.079 [0.121] 
Correlation of the residuals   NFC margins NFC spreads Sov. spreads Herfindahl Loans/Deposits Loans/GDP Lend. margins 1      NFC spreads 0.067 1     Sov. spreads 0.075 0.184 1    Herfindahl -0.054 -0.012 -0.230 1   Loans/Deposits 0.028 -0.026 0.075 0.052 1  Loans/GDP 0.041 0.105 -0.064 -0.029 0.074 1 Note: Only significant estimators are reported; figures in parenthesis are standard errors, while figures in brackets report p-values AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion, SIC is the Schwartz IC, Cov(ri , rj) represents the cross-section covariance of the residuals and LM stands for the maximum likelihood test for serial correlation. 
 
On the other hand, significant changes are found to exist in the relationships 
of the bank lending margins to the explanatory variables, when compared to 
the previous sub-period, for both groups of countries. In particular, the 
Herfindahl ratio is not found to exercise any significant lagged effects on the 
bank lending margins in the first panel of countries (i.e. AT, BE, DE, FI, FR 
and NL), while its significance has obviously increased post-Lehman for the 
second group.  
 
Also, another interesting finding is that sovereign spreads and corporate bond 
spreads are shown to have significant effects, on bank lending margins, while 
they are not shown to exert similarly significant effects in the first period; 
interestingly, the loans-to-gdp ratio is also found to have some, albeit 
marginal, significance for the bank lending margins of the second group of 
countries during this period. These findings combined together may indicate 
that credit relative to the economic cycle (loans-to-gdp) and the bond yields 
from the corporate and sovereign bond markets have increased in 
significance, in line with the increased significance of credit for the distressed 
economies. In particular, the decrease in the provision and the cost of bank 
credit to the real sector in the second group of countries was probably linked 
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to the increased tensions, in the aftermath of the GFC, and the economic 
downturn of these economies, as described in several decisions of the ECB.10 
Finally the loans-to-deposits variable is found to have significant effects on 
bank lending margins for both groups of countries.  
 
Table 9: Granger causality tests: Lending rates margins (2009:1-2014:12) 
Explanatory variable X2 stat. p-value 
First panel of countries (AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, NL) NFC bond spreads 2.062 0.724 Sovereign bond spreads 2.541 0.634 Herfindahl 1.364 0.851 Loans-to-deposits 15.489 0.004 Loans-to-gdp 0.228 0.994 
Second panel of countries (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT) NFC bond spreads 10.664 0.031 Sovereign bond spreads 5.375 0.251 Herfindahl 14.295 0.006 Loans-to-deposits 14.797 0.005 Loans-to-gdp 4.836 0.305 Note: The table reports the results of Chi-square (X2) tests of the null of exclusion of the explanatory variable from the equation of the bank lending margins dependent variable. Figures in bold letters denote rejection of the null. 
 
Investigating formally the overall significance of the lagged explanatory 
effects for bank lending margins, by means of Granger causality tests, largely 
confirms the overall results described above. Specifically, the loans-to-
deposits variable is found to be significant in both panels; a finding that 
seems to indicate similarities between the two groups. Also, euro-area 
corporate bond spreads are found to have causal effects on bank lending 
margins for the second group; for distressed countries, while the immediate 
responses of bank lending margins to corporate bond spreads are negative 
they reverse to being positive after a significant period of time, indicating a 
substitution mechanism between bank lending and the corporate bond 
market (see Table 10, below). On the other hand, as expected by their 
marginal significance, the effects of sovereign bond spreads and the loans-to-                                                        10 See, ECB’s Press Release, “ECB announces monetary policy measures to enhance the 
functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism” 5 June 2014. 
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gdp for the bank lending margins of distressed countries are found not to 
exercise any causal effects. As a result, one could read these findings as 
indicating that heterogeneities of bank lending margins have subsided across 
the two groups in the second sub-period. However as interesting as the result 
of the significance of the causal effects is, similarly interesting is the their 
direction; for this reason we now turn to the results from the impulse 
response function, presented in Table 10 below.  
 
Table 10: Impulse responses of bank lending margins, post-Lehman collapse 
(2009:1 – 2014:12) First panel (AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, NL) Months NFC bond spreads Sovereign  spreads Herfindahl Loans/Deposits Loans/GDP 1 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 2 -0.005 (0.007) 0.007 (0.007) -0.001 (0.005) 0.007 (0.007) -0.002 (0.007) 3 -0.010 (0.010) 0.007 (0.012) -0.001 (0.009) -0.006 (0.013) -0.005 (0.013) 4 -0.015 (0.012) 0.009 (0.017) -0.004 (0.018) -0.018 (0.018) -0.006 (0.017) 5 -0.018 (0.016) 0.009 (0.022) -0.005 (0.018) -0.009 (0.023) -0.007 (0.022) 10 -0.042 (0.029) -0.021 (0.045) -0.021 (0.044) 0.073 (0.053) -0.009 (0.041) 12 -0.053 (0.036) -0.038 (0.055) -0.033 (0.053) 0.113 (0.066) -0.013 (0.049) 18 -0.084 (0.055) -0.083 (0.083) -0.083 (0.079) 0.218 (0105) -0.051 (0.087) 24 -0.109 (0.072) -0.110 (0.108) -0.131 (0.106) 0.279 (0.139) -0.119 (0.119) Second panel (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT) Months NFC bond spreads Sovereign spreads Herfindahl  Loans/Deposits  Loans/GDP  1 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 2 -0.035 (0.013) -0.023 (0.014) -0.012 (0.009) -0.034 (0.014) 0.007 (0.014) 3 -0.048 0.018) -0.056 (0.026) -0.034 (0.018) -0.049 (0.027) -0.010 (0.026) 4 -0.054 (0.027) -0.072 (0.057) -0.052 (0.030) -0.084 (0.054) -0.025 (0.039) 5 -0.067 (0.037) -0.092 (0.050) -0.072 (0.041) -0.084 (0.053) -0.044 (0.049) 10 -0.060 (0.075) -0.149 (0.097) -0.147 (0.115) -0.235 (0.106) -0.148 (0.093) 12 -0.049 (0.089) -0.149 (0.115) -0.132 (0.145) 0.312 (0.123) -0.199 (0.108) 18 -0.021 (0.125) -0.059 (0.167) 0.103 (0.052) -0.565 (0.176) -0.382 (0.159) 24 0.005 (0.101) 0.222 (0.232) 0.683 (0.301) -0.898 (0.243) -0.898 (0.258) 
Note: The table reports the bank lending margins’ accumulated impulse responses to a shock equal to one standard deviation of the explanatory variables, in the next months. Figures in bold letters denote significant responses in a 5% confidence interval, while parentheses are standard errors. 
 
The impulse response functions contribute to the arguments for the existence 
of heterogeneities in the way bank lending margins are determined across the 
two groups of countries. In particular, the loans-to-deposits ratio, even if it is 
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found to exercise significant causal effects in both groups, its direction is 
opposite when one compares these effects in the two groups. In the first 
group the loans-to-deposits ratio is found to increase the bank lending 
margins; this finding may be seen as indicating prudence from the banks of 
the first group of countries. Specifically it is indicated that these banks tend to 
increase the cost of lending to NFCs, the more loans they have provided 
relative to their deposit base.  
 
On the other hand, the negative sign of the responses of bank lending margins 
to a shock in the loans-to-deposits variable in the second group of countries 
may be the result of the same factors lying behind the decreased credit 
provision and the increased cost of credit to NFCs in these countries, but 
under different conditions of economic activity and financial stability. 
Namely, these factors may be either the problems with increased 
delinquencies on the banks’ balance sheets and the new regulatory limitations 
to the banks’ leverage. As a result, these findings may be taken to indicate the 
importance of the conditions forming the response of bank lending margins to 
the new regulatory restrictions that may be related to economic activity for 
the system to become more homogenous.  
 
Finally, for the distressed countries (i.e. ES, GR, IE, IT and PT) the Herfindahl 
ratio, indicating market concentration, is found to have significant positive 
effects although responses occur with a relatively large lag of 18 to 24 months, 
after the shock in the ratio has happened. As noted previously, this finding is 
anticipated if one considers that the banking market concentration has not 
developed similarly across the euro-area and that previous literature (e.g. 
Hristov et al., 2014) attributes the larger spreads in periphery countries to 
changes in the relative importance of structural shocks. As a result, the bank 
market concentration, falling into the definition of a structural shock with 
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particular relevance for this group, is found to be a significant driving factor 
for the increased bank lending margins in these countries, in the post-Lehman 
period. 
 
Finally, again the system of equations is deemed to perform with particular 
efficiency. Specifically, the equations of the bank lending margins are found 
to capture a large part of their deterministic component (adj. R-squared is 0.83 
for the first panel of countries and 0.92 for the second), while the remaining 
part, i.e. the stochastic component, is found to confirm their definite 
characteristics. In particular, the panel unit root tests indicate that the 
residuals of the system are stationary, whereas again autocorrelation does not 
persist and cross-section correlation of the residuals is small enough so that 
we may suggest lack of cross-section dependence that could drive the 
resulting estimators. As a result, for the second period similarly to the first 
one, the in-sample performance of the system provides a satisfactory degree 
of confidence to the estimations for both panels of countries.    
 
 
5. Controlling for ECB’s non-standard liquidity provision 
and robustness checks 
 
5.1 Stylized facts  
In the aftermath of the GFC, the ECB expanded its balance sheet several times; 
this expansion was mainly accomplished by providing ample liquidity to 
eligible monetary operations counterparties. Reichlin (2014) describes the 
non-standard measures adopted by the ECB; these ranged from the expansion 
of the list of eligible collateral to new types of refinancing operations (e.g. 
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targeted longer term refinancing operations, very long-term refinancing 
operations), with only limited recourse to asset purchasing programmes. In 
this regard, Reichlin (2014) highlights the existence of important differences 
between the liquidity provision by ECB’s non-standard measures from the 
asset-buying operations adopted by the Fed or the Bank of England. Thus, the 
liquidity provision by the ECB, is distinguished from alternative non-
standard monetary policies, which have, as a result, expanded the asset side 
of the balance sheet of central banks elsewhere (e.g. the Fed or the Bank of 
England). 
 
At this point, it is important to recall that Goodhart (2010) argues that using 
measures of ‘high-powered’ money, is inadequate for the purposes of 
reflecting monetary developments driven by policies similar the ones the ECB 
followed during the crisis. As a result, the ECB formally has argued (see, ECB 
2012) that the non-standard monetary policy measures are better reflected in 
the developments of the monetary base of the Eurosystem (i.e. ‘base money’). 
In this regard, Giannone et al. (2012) argue that the developments in ECB’s 
base money adequately reflect non-standard monetary policy measures’ 
effects.   
 
In September 2008 the sum of the various liquidity providing monetary policy 
operations was around 460 billion euros and peaked just before the OMT 
announcement by ECB’s president Mario Draghi, on July 2012, to more than 
1.5 trillion euro, falling ever since but stabilizing, by the last quarter of 2014 to 
around 700 billion euro. These developments are reflected in the evolution of 
base money; in particular, we introduce the monthly changes of ECB’s base 
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money, in order to account for all possible effects from these types of non-
standard measures.11 
 
5.2 Incorporating the non-standard increase of liquidity by the 
ECB in the second sub-period 
 
In order to formulate a new setup of the panel VAR model, we enrich the 
setup found to affect the bank lending margins during the period 2009:1 to 
2014:12, by introducing a variable that reflects the changes in ECB’s base 
money compared to its value a year ago. In particular, we formulate a panel 
VAR model that contains only the variables that have been found to exercise 
significant causal effects in the period after the eruption of the global financial 
crisis, together with the monthly changes of base money.  
 
Thus, apart from examining the effects from ECB’s non-standard monetary 
policy for bank lending margins, this analysis also serves as a robustness 
check for the significance of the results presented in the previous section, with 
the presence of base money as a control variable. Tables 11 and 12, below 
present the Granger causality tests and the impulse response functions 
estimated by this panel VAR setup, respectively. 
 
First, the Granger causality tests indicate that, even in the presence of the 
annual changes in base money the significance of the causality relationships 
between the variables found to exercise significant effects on bank lending 
margins are not affected. As a result, this finding confirms that the earlier 
findings with reference to causality relationships are robust even if the 
increase in the provision of liquidity by the ECB, as a response to the GFC and                                                         11 We have also, examined the level and the annual changes of this variable; results are available to the interested reader(s) upon request. 
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the episodes of the euro-area crisis, are taken into account. Similarly, the 
responses of bank lending margins to impulses of the explanatory variables 
remain in the same direction as in section 4.2.  
Table 11: Granger causality tests: Lending rates margins (2009:1-2014:12) 
Explanatory variable X2 stat. p-value 
First panel of countries (AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, NL)  Loans-to-deposits 14.065 0.007 Y-o-y Δ(ECB’s Base money) 22.775 0.000 
Second panel of countries (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT) NFC bond spreads 8.810 0.066 Herfindahl 16.347 0.003 Loans-to-deposits 25.098 0.000 Y-o-y Δ(ECB’s Base money) 2.948 0.567 Note: The table reports the results of Chi-square (X2) tests of the null of exclusion of the explanatory variable from the equation of the bank lending margins dependent variable. Figures in bold letters denote rejection of the null.    
Table 12: Impulse responses of bank lending margins, post-Lehman collapse 
(2009:1 – 2014:12) First panel (AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, NL) Months Loans/Deposits Y-o-y Δ(ECB’s Base money) 1 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 2 0.008 (0.008) -0.018 (0.008) 3 -0.005 (0.013) -0.037 (0.013) 4 -0.020 (0.018) -0.071 (0.018) 5 -0.020 (0.023) -0.097 (0.024) 10 0.015 (0.055) -0.169 (0.044) 12 0.044 (0.071) -0.184 (0.049) 18 0.138 (0.117) -0.209 (0.056)  24 0.217 (0.157) -0.217 (0.066) Second panel (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT) Months NFC bond spreads Herfindahl  Loans/Deposits  Y-o-y Δ(ECB’s Base money) 1 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 2 -0.028 (0.013) -0.016 (0.009) -0.038 (0.014) -0.018 (0.014) 3 -0.028 (0.022) -0.016 (0.009) -0.059 (0.027) -0.038 (0.028) 4 -0.021 (0.028) -0.059 (0.027) -0.073 (0.041) -0.057 (0.039) 5 -0.020 (0.039) -0.075 (0.040) -0.112 (0.054) -0.073 (0.054) 10 0.032 (0.077) -0.139 (0.118) -0.325 (0.108) -0.113 (0.108) 12 0.057 (0.090) -0.107 (0.152) -0.428 (0.125) -0.125 (0.122) 18 0.119 (0.121) 0.233 (0.265) -0.755 (0.177) -0.139 (0.154) 24 0.162 (0.155) 0.911 (0.406) -1.098 (0.252) -0.111 (0.196) 
Note: The table reports the bank lending margins’ accumulated impulse responses to a shock equal to one standard deviation of the explanatory variables, in the next months. Figures in bold letters denote significant responses in a 5% confidence interval, while parentheses are standard errors. 
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The main differences are found to exist in the significance of the specific 
points in time of the responses, i.e. of the ‘term structure’ of the responses. In 
particular, with the inclusion of changes in ECB’s base money, the euro-area 
corporate bond spreads are found to have a causal impact with a larger delay, 
compared to the findings of the previous section. As a result, the positive sign 
of the responses, to a permanent increase in NFC bond spreads is not 
observed after 24 months, as it was in section 4.2, but much earlier. The 
positive responses of the bank lending margin of the distressed countries to a 
positive shock in the NFC bond spreads, indicates the role of bank lending 
and corporate bonds as substitute sources of funding for NFCs in distressed 
countries. Also, in this section we find that when the increase in the provision 
of money from the ECB is taken into account policy initiatives aiming to (a) 
activate the capital markets as a source of funding for the real economy and 
(b) decrease the cost of funding for periphery countries’ NFCs may also lead 
to decreases in the cost of bank financing.  
 
It is equally important to pay attention to the effects exercised by the changes 
in the base money on bank lending margins for the two groups of countries. 
We find that in the non-distressed countries the panel VAR results to 
significant and negative causal effects; i.e. this finding indicates that an 
increase in the money base in the euro-area results in decreasing the bank 
lending margins in euro-area core. On the other hand, the relationship 
between changes in ECB’s base money and bank lending margins, for 
distressed countries, is not found to be significant. As a result, an important 
heterogeneity exists between the two groups. This finding sits well with the 
heterogeneous transmission of ECB’s monetary policy, as highlighted in ECB 
(2015, p. 27-28) and Hristov et al. (2014), who attribute heterogeneities in the 
transmission of monetary policy to changes in response to structural shocks 
or increased volatility across the euro-area countries (see, page 109). 
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5.3 Robustness of the findings to country-specific effects  
In order to clarify whether the reported findings are not driven by country-
specific properties of the variables, but reflect system-wide relationships, as is 
our aim, we have performed some additional robustness checks designed ad-
hoc for the purposes of the present paper. In particular we repeat the panel 
VAR setup for the second and most crucial period by excluding each time one 
of the countries that participate in each of the panels. Table 13 presents the 
Granger causality results. 
 
Table 13: Significance of explanatory var’s when excluding countries from the 
panel (2009:1-2014:12, Granger causality tests) First panel of countries (AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, NL) Countries NFC bonds Sov. bonds Herfindahl L-t-D L-t-G All 2.062 [0.724] 2.541 [0.634] 1.364 [0.851] 15.489 [0.004] 0.228 [0.994] Excl. AT 2.069 [0.723] 2.857 [0.582] 0847 [0.931] 19.225 [0.001] 1.561 [0.816] Excl. BE 4.203 [0.379] 6.436 [0.169] 1.869 [0.759] 14.619 [0.006] 0.733 [0.947] Excl. DE 3.936 [0.415] 4.414 [0.353] 1.502 [0.826] 14.099 [0.007] 1.361 [0.851] Excl. FI 8.715 [0.071] 5.874 [0.209] 13.297 [0.009] 19.246 [0.001] 5.132 [0.274] Excl. FR 0.761 [0.943] 2.531 [0.639] 1.679 [0.795] 17.799 [0.001] 0.312 [0.989] Excl. NL 2.061 [0.724] 2.541 [0.637] 1.364 [0.851] 15.488 [0.004] 0.228 [0.994] Second panel of countries (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT) All 10.664 [0.031] 5.375 [0.251] 14.295 [0.006] 14.797 [0.005] 4.836 [0.305] Excl. ES 10.976 [0.027] 7.351 [0.119] 9.443 [0.051] 14.582 [0.006] 4.939 [0.294] Excl. GR 10.838 [0.034] 7.043 [0.134] 5.736 [0.219] 21.582 [0.000] 4.525 [0.339] Excl. IE 8.875 [0.064] 5.245 [0.263] 9.728 [0.045] 6.939 [0.139] 4.469 [0.347] Excl. IT 11.348 [0.023] 5.371 [0.251] 14.219 [0.007] 14.114 [0.007] 7.135 [0.129] Excl. PT 12.316 [0.015] 4.400 [0.355] 21.148 [0.000] 14.218 [0.007] 6.857 [0.143] Note: The table reports the results of Chi-square (X2) tests of the null of exclusion of the explanatory variable from the equation of the bank lending margins dependent variable. Figures in bold letters denote rejection of the null and brackets report p-values. 
 
Table 13 confirms the significance of the loans-to-deposits variable that has 
been found to exercise causal effects on bank lending margins of non-
distressed countries, in every case of country excluded. Another interesting 
finding is that when Finland is excluded from the panel, the corporate bond 
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spreads and the Herfindahl ratio gain significance; although this does not 
change the results reported previously, as the loans-to-deposits remains a 
significant driver of bank lending margins, it is interesting to note that 
corporate bond spreads and market concentration are significant in the first 
panel of countries. This finding may indicate the probable broader scope of 
the current policy initiatives for a unified capital market for non-distressed 
countries as well.  
 
On the other hand, the exclusion of Greece from the second panel of countries 
lifts the significance of the Herfindahl ratio. This finding may be justified if 
we take into account that the Greek banking market experienced the most 
profound changes during the crisis period, resulting in wide and deep 
changes of its structure. Thus, the market concentration may have only 
country-specific causal effects for bank lending margins. Similarly, from this 
examination we find that the loans-to-deposits ratio has country-specific 
causal effects on bank lending margins, with reference to Ireland. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
In the present paper the bank lending margins for euro-area NFCs have been 
examined, with particular focus on two panels of euro-area (distressed and 
non-distressed) countries and two periods of time pre- and post-Lehman. For 
this purpose, we have employed panel VAR techniques in which the bank 
lending margins, together with other variables either related to banks’ credit 
policies or to the cost of funding in other segments of the financial system, 
have been examined as endogenous variables. In this context, the finding, 
well-documented in previous literature, that banking market power exerts a 
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significant positive effect on the cost of financing the economy finds support 
in our analysis.  
 
On the other hand, our results indicate that bank lending margins to euro-
area NFCs are determined heterogeneously across different euro-area 
countries. While this finding, again, has been reported elsewhere in the 
literature, our findings go a step further by suggesting that possibly 
successful advancement of European policy initiatives, aiming to enable and 
ease market funding for NFCs, may affect the cost of bank lending, thus 
potentially contributing to decreasing the heterogeneities across the euro-area 
countries. 
 
Finally, asking whether the ECB’s provision of liquidity, under the non-
standard monetary policy measures applied post-Lehman has played its 
foreseen role, the answer is positive but only partially. Again finding 
heterogeneous responses to provision of liquidity by the ECB, strengthens the 
argument that further policy initiatives are important for homogenizing 
financial conditions and, as a result, deepening economic integration of the 
euro area.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
2003:1 – 2008:9  Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Bank lending margins 0.967 1.038 1.137 1.074 1.505 1.953 2.254 1.638 1.007 2.614 1.273 0.218 0.085 0.202 0.145 0.160 0.257 0.166 0.244 0.137 0.330 0.145 Herfindahl ratio 5.217 20.188 27.254 6.727 1.816 11.142 6.340 2.628 18.820 11.127 4.789 0.439 1.188 2.259 0.430 0.082 0.337 0.405 0.397 1.474 0.290 0.196 Loans-to-gdp 1.957 0.692 0.601 0.860 1.025 0.832 1.592 1.108 1.336 0.553 0.619 0.248 0.093 0.079 0.146 0.028 0.252 0.463 0.196 0.117 0.057 0.145 Loans-to-deposits 1.194 0.841 1.519 1.237 1.367 0.787 1.619 1.488 1.346 1.542 1.690 0.044 0.043 0.096 0.098 0.044 0.021 0.179 0.083 0.037 0.089 0.316 NFC bond spread 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.649 Sovereign spreads 0.043 0.092 0.003 0.045 0.000 0.245 0.000 0.228 0.048 0.132 0.048 0.061 0.093 0.079 0.047 0.000 0.127 0.125 0.103 0.057 0.109 0.074 CISS 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 Y-o-Y Δ(Base money) 714.5 714.5 714.5 714.5 714.5 714.5 714.5 714.5 714.5 714.5 714.5 159.1 159.1 159.1 159.1 159.1 159.1 159.1 159.1 159.1 159.1 159.1 
2008:10 – 2014:12 Bank lending margins 0.974 1.427 1.808 1.135 1.772 1.959 2.090 1.369 1.545 3.207 1.326 0.197 0.121 0.189 0.132 0.197 0.741 0.591 0.252 0.344 0.571 0.734 Herfindahl ratio 4.042 11.904 32.770 5.770 2.847 16.280 6.707 3.982 19.692 12.912 6.557 0.088 2.245 2.267 0.254 0.277 4.085 0.241 0.299 2.350 2.490 1.078 Loans-to-gdp 2.486 0.771 0.953 1.186 1.090 1.305 2.146 1.560 1.623 0.679 0.759 
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0.037 0.033 0.101 0.081 0.075 0.094 0.328 0.038 0.054 0.063 0.121 Loans-to-deposits 1.240 0.647 1.541 1.343 1.121 1.040 1.566 1.335 1.239 1.505 1.644 0.017 0.044 0.078 0.117 0.071 0.160 0.209 0.077 0.038 0.151 0.209 NFC bond spread 1.067 1.067 1.067 1.067 1.067 1.067 1.067 1.067 1.067 1.067 1.067 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 Sovereign spreads 0.512 0.926 0.300 0.554 0.000 10.286 3.247 2.186 0.321 4.524 2.287 0.263 0.537 0.137 0.273 0.000 8.741 2.062 1.178 0.133 3.274 1.313 CISS 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.195 Y-o-Y Δ(Base money) 1268.3 1268.3 1268.3 1268.3 1268.3 1268.3 1268.3 1268.3 1268.3 1268.3 1268.3 220.8 220.8 220.8 220.8 220.8 220.8 220.8 220.8 220.8 220.8 220.8 
Note: The table reports means and standard deviations (denoted in italics) of the series for the periods 2003:1 to 2008:9 (pre-crisis period) and 2008:10 to 2014:12 (post-crisis period).                       
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Chart A2: Inverse roots of the AR characteristic polynomial (2003:1-
2008:8)  
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